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ABSTRACT 
 
INTEREST GROUPS AND INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION 
  
Arasıl, Yavuz  
 M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı 
September 2011 
 
This study proposes an original formal political economy model of institutional 
evolution to analyze the effects of evolving interest groups on institutional change by 
extending the model of Neyaptı (2010). Institutions are categorized as formal (F) and 
informal (N) institutions that exhibit different evolutionary patterns. N evolves with 
capital accumulation, as in learning by doing, and F is optimally chosen by a 
government who maximizes the weighted sum of the utilities of two different interest 
groups. The level of informal institutions, which represents business ethics, way of 
doing business or the level of technological know-how, differs for each group. F and 
N together define the production technology and affect the income level of each 
group. The model is such that institutions, as well as the levels of income and capital 
stocks are dynamically interrelated. The simulations of the model show that F 
exhibits a punctuated evolutionary path. This path is observed to be affected by 
income share of the institutions, income share of the capital, saving rate and cost of 
institutional change. 
 
Keywords: Institutional evolution, punctuated equilibria, growth 
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ÖZET 
 
MENFAAT GRUPLARI VE KURUMSAL DEĞİŞİM 
  
Arasıl, Yavuz  
 Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyaptı 
Eylül 2011 
 
Bu çalışmada, zaman içerisinde değişim gösteren menfaat gruplarının kurumsal 
değişime etkisi, Neyaptı (2010)’u temel alarak genişleten orijinal bir politik iktisat 
modeli ile açıklanmıştır. Kurumlar resmi (F) ve gayrı resmi (N) olmak üzere ikiye 
ayrılmıştır. N sermaye birikimiyle doğru orantılı olarak gelişirken, F devlet 
tarafından iki menfaat grubunun toplam fayda fonksiyonlarını ençoklayacak şekilde 
seçilmektedir. İş kültürü, bilgi birikimi, iş yapma şekli gibi kavramları temsil eden 
gayrı resmi kurumların kalitesi gruplar arasında farklılık göstermektedir. F ile N 
birlikte üretim teknolojisini belirleyerek ilgili grupların gelir düzeylerine doğrudan 
etki etmektedir. Bu modelde, her iki grubun da sermaye stoklarının seviyesi ve gelir 
düzeyleri kurumların kalitesi ile dinamik bir etkileşim halindedir. Modelin 
simülasyonları resmi kurumların zaman içerisinde bir müddet değişime uğramayıp 
daha sonra da belirli bir kurumsal kaliteye ani şekilde zıplayarak geliştiğini 
göstermektedir. Resmi kurumların değişiminin, sermayenin ve kurumların gelirdeki 
payı, tasarruflar ve kurumsal değişimin maliyeti gibi etkenlere bağlı olduğu 
görülmüştür. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kurumsal değişim, büyüme 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Social scientists mostly agree that institutions are key factors of economic 
development and growth. Institutions can be categorized as formal and informal 
institutions. Formal institutions are laws, rules and regulations that define the 
organizational characteristics, while informal institutions are considered as business 
ethics, norms, customs and traditions.  
 
A newly emerging field of economic literature that may be called new development 
economics (NDE)1, focuses on the relationship between economic development and 
institutions. NDE is based on two fundamental approaches of institutional economics: 
collective action and transaction cost theories. Collective action (CA) theory which is 
developed by Olson (1965 and 1982) provides a dynamical framework for 
institutional change and analyzes the circumstances under which powerful interest 
groups that may affect the process of institutional change are formed and become 
effective. On the other hand, transaction cost (TC) theory, developed by Coase 
(1960), Williamson (1985) and North (1990), argues that institutions adapt to 
economic development to reduce transaction costs. According to this theory, changes 
in the productive factors and production relations give way to new types of 
                                                 
1
 See Neyaptı (2010b) who uses this term to name a new strand of development economics that 
combines new institutional economics with collective action theory. 
 2 
transaction costs or changes in existing transaction costs; these changes are 
considered as the main factors that trigger the need for institutional change. However, 
transaction cost theory appears inadequate in explaining institutional dynamics. In 
light of these, both Nabli and Nugent (1989) and Neyaptı (2010b) view CA and TC 
theories as complementary to each other. 
 
Synthesizing the arguments of CA and TC theories provides a deeper understanding 
of the nature of institutional evolution. As technological and economic developments 
occur, production relations and preferences change. Hence, the need for new 
institutional structure arises. Next, the process via which this need turns into action 
that affects institutional change requires explanation. Often, the existing interest 
groups show resistance against institutional change while economic and 
technological developments may lead to the formation of new interest groups that 
support change. The interplay of different interest groups motivated by their 
expected losses and benefits, determines the path of institutional evolution.  
 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) shed light on the evolutionary path of institutions in 
the political science literature, inspired by the hypothesis of punctuated equilibrium 
which originally belongs to biology. They show that policies are generally sticky and 
policy changes show themselves in the form of sudden changes instead of continuous 
progression. Since formal institutions are kind of regulatory policies, several studies 
in the recent literature discuss that their evolution can be analyzed in a punctuated 
equilibrium framework. However, the existing literature mentions about punctuated 
nature of institutional evolution in a descriptive way rather proposing a formal model. 
 
The concepts of game theory are also commonly referred to in the context of 
institutional evolution. However, according to Neyapti (2010a), although game 
 3 
theory is a useful tool for understanding institutions, it is not fully sufficient to 
explain institutional evolution. She states that game theoretic approach to 
institutional evolution focuses on the effects of individual choices without 
considering societal forces which have important impact on shaping the institutional 
structure in society.  In game-theory models, evolution of institutions is seen as 
transition from one equilibrium to another. 
 
Acemoğlu (2006) is the first that propose a formal political economy model which 
explains the effect of various groups on the evolution of institutions, where the 
interactions and decisions of these groups are modeled as a dynamic game. However, 
this model does not make a distinction between formal and informal institutions and 
also does not discuss the punctuated nature of institutional evolution. 
 
Neyaptı (2010b)’s dynamic model of institutional evolution analyzes the evolution of 
both formal and informal institutions and show that formal institutions exhibits a 
punctuated evolutionary path.  In this study, we modify and extend this study by 
explicitly incorporating the effects of evolving interest groups. The aim of this study 
is to propose an original political economy model of institutional evolution which 
replicates the evidence regarding institutional change that is of a punctuated nature. 
 
In what follows, chapter 2 gives brief information about some studies related to 
institutional change, chapter 3 presents our formal model, simulation results and their 
interpretations, chapter 4 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
 
This section gives information about some important works related to institutional 
evolution. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 provides detailed explanation of collective action and 
transaction cost theories respectively, section 2.3 discusses punctuated equilibrium 
concept and section 2.4 presents some formal models of institutional evolution. 
 
2.1) Collective Action Theory 
Development Economics literature has increasingly been concerned with explaining 
the question of institutional evolution. Collective Action (CA) theory which is 
developed by Olson (1965 and 1982) brings a dynamical approach for institutional 
evolution. CA theory focuses on the circumstances under which powerful special 
interest groups (SIGs) are formed and become effective. According to this theory, 
these powerful interest groups have a large impact on institutional change by 
affecting the government’s policy decisions. Olson (1965) categorizes interest groups 
into two types. The first one is narrow special-interest groups which are small and 
homogeneous groups that can easily be organized. The other one is encompassing 
special-interest groups which have large number of members and more 
heterogeneous as compared to narrow interest groups. Olson argues that 
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encompassing special interest groups can not be organized easily due to their size 
and heterogeneity.  
 
According to Olson (1982), narrow special interest groups may be harmful to society 
by preventing socio-economic development. He argues that these interest groups 
divert resources for their own sakes although this action may create a large burden 
for the whole society. Since narrow interest groups are small and constitute a little 
portion of a society, their share from the overall burden is very small. In other words, 
they do not face with the entire cost resulting from their actions.  Hence, the benefit 
that they obtain from diverting resources to themselves is greater than the cost they 
pay. In this sense, there are net gains for narrow interest groups from collective 
action. 
 
In contrast to narrow special interest groups, Olson (1982 and 1995) argues that 
encompassing special interest groups are not harmful to society. The reason behind 
this argument is that, since encompassing SIGs are large groups, they must bear a 
large share of the cost that accrues to society. Hence, they can not gain from any 
policy which is costly or harmful to society. Olson (1995) states that it is rational for 
encompassing SIGs to support policies which minimize social costs or the most 
efficient methods of redistribution rather than supporting policies which will 
maximize their narrow benefits. For this reason, encompassing interest groups have 
an important effect on institutional change. During the post World War II period, like 
in many other countries, there were great macroeconomic instabilities in Germany, 
Sweden, Norway and Austria. Olson (1995) argues that, in these countries, large 
fraction of the society supported the idea of institutional change and as a result, 
encompassing labor unions and employers’ federations are established. The 
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economic policy and structure of institutions was motivated by these groups. The 
newly formed institutions which helped to achieve economic success are called best 
practice institutions. Neyaptı (2010a) also states that the current financial crisis in the 
U.S is an example that collects wide ranging support for reform in regulatory 
financial institutions. 
 
According to Olson (1995), encompassing special interest groups may also devolve 
into powerful narrow special interest groups in stable economies. Moreover, these 
newly formed SIGs may resist again beneficial institutional reforms for society and 
can be successful in this way as a result of their influence on government’s policies. 
Olson uses the term “institutional sclerosis” to describe this situation. He argues that 
the reason of stagnation in Sweden and Germany during the 1980s can be explained 
via this phenomena. The devolution of early established encompassing labor unions 
into narrow SIGs that engaged into monopolistic lobbying activities, led to sclerotic 
institutions and thus economic inefficiencies. This special case of institutional 
sclerosis is named as “Eurosclerosis” by Olson. According to Neyapti (2010a), 
Olson’s institutional sclerosis idea implies that institutional change tend to occur 
slowly as compared to economic progress. 
 
2.2) New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
  
The International Society of New Institutional Economics (ISNIE) defines NIE as 
An interdisciplinary enterprise combining economics, law, organization 
theory, political science, sociology and anthropology to understand the 
institutions of social, political and commercial life. It borrows liberally from 
various social-science disciplines, but its primary language is economics. Its 
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goal is to explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes they 
serve, how they change and how-if at all-they should be reformed. 
(www.isne.org) 
NIE literature mainly built on the arguments of transaction cost theory which is 
developed by Coase (1960), Williamson (1985) and North (1990).  
 
North (1990) defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction. These are made up of formal constraints, which can be rules, laws, 
constitutions and regulations; and informal constraints, such as norms of behavior, 
conventions and self imposed codes of conduct and their enforcement characteristics. 
North (1990) argues that institutions and technology together determine the 
transaction and transformation costs and hence the incentive structure of societies 
and economies, via affecting factors such as profitability and feasibility of engaging 
in an economic activity. Furthermore, institutions emerge and exist in order to reduce 
these transaction costs. Hence, by reducing transaction costs, institutions lead to 
more efficient markets.  
 
According to North (1990), the main driving force of institutional evolution is the 
interaction between institutions and organizations. In this sense, institutions are 
considered as rules of the game, whose players are organizations and entrepreneurs. 
Organizations are the entities formed by a group of people who have common 
objectives. Hence, creators of an organization aim to maximize wealth, income or 
want to obtain a gain from other kind of opportunities provided by the institutional 
structure in the society.  Moreover, institutional structure determines the direction of 
the acquisition of knowledge and skills for the members of organizations, which have 
important implications for the long-run development of the society.  
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North (1990) argues that maximizing behavior of the organization is not only limited 
with making choices within the existing constraints, but also there may be 
opportunity to alter the constraints. In other words, rather than investing in skills and 
knowledge that will pay off, an organization or a firm can use its resources for the 
purpose of changing institutional structure. When the gains from changing the 
institutions is higher than the gains from investing in existing constraints, powerful 
organizations want to alter the institutional structure. Moreover, these kinds of 
organizations motivate the society investing in skills and knowledge that will 
increase their profitability indirectly.  
 
Transaction cost theory considers adaptive efficiency as crucial factor for 
institutional evolution. North (2005) defines adaptive efficiency as the ability of a 
society to flexibly adjust in the face of shocks and adopt institutions which can deal 
with altered conditions successfully. North (1990) states that, in societies with high 
level of adaptive efficiency, people maximize their efforts in order to explore 
alternative ways of solving problems. 
 
North (1990) argues that, the process of institutional change is highly incremental 
through marginal adjustments to the complex of norms, rules and enforcement 
mechanisms which are members of institutional structure. Furthermore he states that, 
the main sources of institutional change are: changes in the relative prices such as 
changes in the ratio of factor prices, changes in the cost of information and changes 
in technology. More explicitly, when relative prices change, one or both parties who 
trade with each other perceive that altering the agreement or contract will be more 
profitable for them. At least one of the parties will make an attempt to change the 
contract. On the other hand, since contracts are embedded in higher set of rules, 
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renegotiation may not be possible. Therefore, parties may devote all their resources 
to change rules at higher level. In addition to formal set of rules, informal constraints 
such as norms of behavior or customs which have important role in guiding the 
exchange process will be slowly modified or destroyed. According to North (1990), 
the main role of the informal institutions is to supplement, extend or modify formal 
institutions. He considers formal and informal institutions as a package, thus a 
change in one of these institutions will lead to disequilibrium which implies new 
transaction costs. In his framework, new informal rules evolve gradually after a 
change in formal rules.   
 
As Olson (1982), North (1990) also discusses persistence of inefficient institutions. 
He extends Arthur (1988)’s arguments, which are about adoption of inefficient 
technologies, to the institutional framework. Arthur (1988) argues that the main 
factors that cause the adoption of inefficient technologies are: (i) multiple equilibria: 
indeterminate outcome as a result of more than one solutions (ii) possible 
inefficiencies: an efficient technology may die out due to its bad luck in gaining 
popularity (iii) lock in: once a solution is reached it may be impossible to exit (iv) 
path dependence: the strong effects of the past decisions on the present and future. 
Since the technology that Arthur (1988) deals with exhibits increasing returns like 
institutions, North generalizes Arthur’s ideas to explain the nature of institutional 
persistence. Although he thinks that all four factors have a role on the persistence of 
institutions, he mostly focuses on the effects of path dependence and discusses the 
factors that shape the path in a detailed manner. North (1990) argues that, increasing 
returns characteristics of institutions and imperfect markets with high transaction 
costs are the two main forces that shape the path of institutional evolution. In the 
presence of imperfect markets with high transaction costs, information feedback is 
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insufficient and thus agents modify their subjective models based on imperfect 
information and insufficient feedback. The subjectively derived models together with 
the ideology shape the path. Furthermore, historically derived perceptions of the 
agents also affect their choices. Combination of all these factors leads to inefficient 
paths. Path dependence limits the choices of economic agents and links decision 
makings over time. According to North (1990), unproductive or inefficient paths 
persist when the increasing returns characteristics of initial set of institutions do not 
provide incentives or provide disincentives to productive activities. In such a case, 
some organizations and interest groups that benefit from existing institutional 
structure will emerge and shape the polity according to their benefits. On the other 
hand, societies with high level of adaptive efficiency may avoid unproductive paths 
by allowing for a maximum number of choices under uncertainty and encourages 
trial of various paths, which helps to eliminate inefficient choices. 
 
North’s framework about persistence of inefficient institutions has some common 
points with the Olson’s institutional sclerosis idea. In both of the cases, some 
powerful groups (North prefers to use the term organization) benefits from existing 
institutional structure and do not allow for institutional reform by affecting 
government’s decisions. However, while explaining the institutional reforms or 
persistence of institutions Olson provides a clearer dynamical framework than North 
in terms of interest group dynamics. He explicitly discusses the formation or 
devolution process of interest groups whereas North generally makes his analysis 
with a given set of organizations. On the other hand, Olson does not make a strong 
discrimination between formal and informal institutions as North. Both of their ideas 
support and reinforce the hypothesis of punctuated equilibrium which we now turn to 
in order to describe the evolutionary pattern of institutions. 
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2.3) Punctuated Equilibrium 
Punctuated equilibrium hypothesis originally belongs to evolutionary biology and is 
developed by Elridge and Gould (1972). In contrast to Darwin’s framework, which 
describes evolution as continuous and slow process, authors argue that evolution is 
characterized by long periods of stability, punctuated by short and revolutionary 
jumps that yield to extinction of current species and emergence of new forms of life. 
This idea gave inspiration to political scientist to describe the policy changes. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) are the first to adopt the idea of punctuated 
equilibrium to political science. They describe the policy process in U.S by using the 
punctuated equilibrium hypothesis. Baumgartner and Jones (1993:251) state that 
“…our government can best be understood as a series of institutionally enforced 
stabilities, periodically punctuated by a dramatic change.” The authors use the term 
“policy monopolies” to describe a group of decision makers with a monopolistic 
power on specific policy issues and institutional structure. Policy monopolies limit 
access to policy making process, thus restrict the change. These monopolies come 
into existence as a result of enthusiastic mobilization (the authors use the term 
“Downsian mobilization”) wherein policymakers are supported for the policy 
changes and institutional reforms.  Once a policy monopoly is created through 
Downsian mobilization, it becomes a dominant power over some policy issues and 
limits the discussions about policy changes. According to Baumgartner and Jones 
(1993), policy changes occur when the existing policy monopolies corrupt. This 
corruption occurs as a result of second type of mobilization which they explain as “it 
often stems from the efforts of opponents of status quo to expand the scope of 
conflict.”  In light of these facts, the authors characterize the policy changes in U.S 
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and reach the conclusion that most of the policies perform punctuated type of 
equilibrium over time. 
 
The arguments of Baumgartner and Jones (1993) about policy change are closely 
related with the Olson’s “institutional sclerosis” idea. While explaining the process 
of institutional evolution, Olson argues that sclerotic institutions, which are 
supported by narrow interest groups, continue to exist until a large fraction of the 
society  oppose to these institutions and support institutional reform due to the cost 
resulting from the inefficiencies that these institutions generate. In this sense, policy 
monopolies which are created through Downsian mobilization can be considered as 
powerful narrow special interest groups that lead to persistence of inefficient 
institutions. On the other hand, emergence of encompassing interest groups that 
support beneficial institutional reforms can be interpreted as second type of 
mobilization that lead to corruption of  existing policy monopolies which limit policy 
changes.  
 
There are also some other works that try to explain or show the punctuated patterns 
of institutional evolution. Roland (2004) makes an analogy between institutional 
change and earthquakes. He argues that slow changes in informal institutions are like 
increasing tectonic pressures which triggers earthquakes, namely sudden changes in 
formal institutions. Neyaptı (2010a) argues that this analogy of Roland (2004) is a 
good way of describing punctuated equilibrium pattern of institutions. Additionally, 
it is possible to observe some empirical works that measure the quality of formal 
institutions depict patterns of institutional evolution that exhibit punctuated type 
equilibrium. (See, for example Dinçer and Neyaptı (2008), and Cukierman et al., 
(2002)) 
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2.4) Formal Models of Institutional Evolution 
Based on the arguments of CA theory, TC theory and punctuated equilibrium 
hypothesis, Neyaptı (2010b) formally models the evolution of formal and informal 
institutions. According to Neyapti (2010b), evolution of informal institutions follows 
learning by doing, which implies that the quality of these institutions increases with 
the capital stock. Hence, the progression of informal institutions is modeled as a 
positive function of capital stock and existing informal institutions. On the other 
hand, formal institutions are optimally chosen by government in order to maximize 
the total output. Neyaptı (2010b) argues that, when production factors change as a 
result of continuous technological improvements, informal institutions which 
represent production relations adapt to these changes easily. In contrast to informal 
institutions, higher organization levels of production, which are regulated by laws, 
may show resistance against change and become inconsistent with other components 
of production. Formal institutions represent these aspects of production and only 
change when the cost of such inconsistencies exceeds the cost of institutional 
persistence. In this model, formal institutions lag behind the informal institutions and 
exhibit punctuated type of equilibria over time. While explaining the dynamics of 
institutional change, Neyaptı (2010b) models technology as a function of formal and 
informal institutions. She also states that, due to the effect of powerful interest 
groups and governmental processes, formal institutions evolve more slowly than 
informal institutions. This model, however, does not incorporate the evolution of 
interest groups or the aspect of political economy explicitly. 
 
Acemoğlu (2006) also discusses the emergence and persistence of inefficient 
institutions by proposing a political economy model. According to Acemoğlu (2006), 
inefficient institutions emerge and persist when there exists some powerful groups 
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which prefer inefficient (non growth enhancing) policies that these institutions 
generate and when there is no social arrangement that can restrict these powerful 
groups. His model has three types of groups: middle class producers, elite producers 
and workers. Elite class producers and middle class producers have an access to 
investment opportunities with different level of productivity. Acemoğlu (2006) also 
categorizes institutions as economic institutions and political institutions. Political 
institutions govern the allocation of “de jure” political power in the society (“de jure” 
political power is power that is allocated by laws) and economic institutions are 
related with the economic constraints and rules governing economic interactions 
such as enforcement of property rights, regulation of technology and taxation and 
redistribution.  
 
The political economy model of Acemoğlu (2006) discusses and models the main 
sources of inefficient policies which arise as a result of elite’s desire to extract rents 
from the rest of the society. The main sources of inefficient policies are revenue 
extraction, factor price manipulation and political consolidation activities of elite 
producers. The author states that, since institutions determine the framework for 
policy determination, inefficient policies translate into inefficient institutions; hence, 
the forces that lead to inefficient policy choices also encourage the elite to choose 
inefficient economic institutions. By choosing inefficient institutions, the elite can 
prevent the enforcement of property rights for middle class producers or can block 
technology adoption by middle class producers. Similarly, in order to preserve their 
“de jure” political power, the elite do not support for the change in political 
institutions which can alter their political power. 
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Finally, Acemoğlu (2006) analyzes the changes in political institutions. The groups 
without “de jure” political power can organize and put pressure on elite class 
producers to change current institutional structure. Acemoğlu uses the term “de 
facto” political power to describe the power of the organized groups. With sufficient 
“de facto” political power, these groups can successfully change the institutions 
although the elite show resistance to change.  
 
In modeling his arguments, Acemoğlu (2006) considers an infinite horizon economy 
populated by a continuum of three types of agents. In that model, the only mission of 
the workers is to supply their labor force inelastically. On the other hand, the elite 
and middle class producers have an access to production opportunities with different 
levels of productivity. Hence, productivity and capital stocks of these groups are 
taken as different in respective production functions. According to the model, the 
only policy instrument is taxation of the elite and middle class producers. In addition 
to taxes, the government also obtains revenues from natural resources which are 
taken as exogenous. Tax revenues and rents from natural resources are redistributed 
as lump sum transfers to each group. 
 
Elite and middle class producers take wages as given and maximize their profits. 
According to model, the three mechanisms2 that lead to inefficient policies arise from 
different policies regarding the taxation of the middle class producers. The elite 
initially hold political power and decide on taxation policies. In revenue extraction 
case, the elite optimally choose tax rates on middle class producers in order to 
maximize their revenues from transfer payments. In this case, the elite never tax 
themselves and redistribute all the government revenues to them. In factor price 
                                                 
2
 These mechanisms are:  revenue extraction, factor price manipulation and political consolidation 
which are already mentioned in the previous page. 
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manipulation case, the elite set high taxes on middle class producers in order to 
reduce labor demand and thus profitability of the middle class. The elite producers 
face with the lower wages as a result of reduced labor demand. In political 
consolidation case, Acemoğlu assumes that there is a probability p such that political 
power shifts from elite to middle class. This probability is modeled as a positive 
function of income level of the middle class producers. To find the optimal taxation, 
he solves the utility maximization problem of the elite producer recursively where 
bellman equation is also a function of p. 
 
In order to model institutional change and persistence, he assumes that the middle 
class obtains enough de facto political power, with some exogenous probability, such 
that they can end the domination of the elite class. Furthermore he assumes that there 
is a cost of changing existing regime for middle class which is also taken as 
exogenous. Acemoğlu (2006) defines states with the information about the group in 
power, and the level of threat against their political power. He models the process of 
institutional change as a dynamic game between the middle class and the elite 
producers and solves for the Markov-perfect equilibria in order to derive the 
conditions for institutional change. He also assumes that the state at which middle 
class producers are in power is an absorbing state, which implies that institutions will 
never change again once the middle class becomes dominant group. 
 
Although Acemoglu (2006) explains the persistence and evolution of institutions in a 
formal way, he doesn’t mention about the punctuated nature of institutional evolution; 
in addition, he neither differentiates between formal and informal institutions nor 
models the evolution of interest groups explicitly.  
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The concepts of game theory are widely used in the literature to explain institutional 
evolution. Since institutions are considered as humanly devised rules that govern the 
economic interactions between the agents and agents are players of the game, the 
decisions of agents together with their interactions are modeled in a game theoretic 
perspective. Desierto (2005), for example, proposes a model where economic growth 
depends on co-evolution of institutions and technology. In this paper, she modifies 
the Romer (1990) model by incorporating institutional and technological evolution in 
order to explain the transitional dynamics. Desierto (2005) considers institutions as 
an accumulating environment-specific knowledge and as a factor in the innovation 
process. She employs as an evolutionary game whereby boundedly-rational firms 
decide the allocation of their resources between institutional spending and research 
expenditures. 
 
Yao (2004) also studies institutional change in a game theory framework and argues 
that institutional change is sensitive to the distribution of welfare and sticky with 
respect to economic environment. As Acemoğlu (2006), both Desierto (2005) and 
Yao (2004) model institutional change without making distinction between formal 
and informal institutions. Furthermore their models do not incorporate evolution of 
interest groups. The next chapter explains how the current study attempts to close the 
gaps in the literature on institutional evolution.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
THE MODEL AND SIMULATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
The models which I briefly explained in chapter 2 try to investigate specific aspects 
of institutional change. The political economy model of Acemoğlu (2006) analyzes 
the persistence and evolution of institutions without making distinction between 
formal and informal institutions. It also does not argue or predict the punctuated 
nature of the process of institutional evolution. 
 
Neyaptı (2010b) provides a model that explains the dynamics of formal and informal 
institutional changes and predicts the punctuated equilibria. However, political 
economy part has not been incorporated explicitly into the model. Desierto (2005) 
and Yao (2004) also analyze institutional change dynamically without taking the 
effects of interest groups into account and investigating the interactions between the 
formal and informal institutions. 
 
Currently, to our best knowledge, there exists no study in the literature which models 
formal and informal institutional change by considering the effects of interest groups. 
In this study, we extend and modify Neyaptı (2010b) paper by explicitly 
incorporating interest groups into the model. This presents an original formal model 
for the political economy of institutional evolution in relation with economic 
development. This chapter is organized as follows: section 3.1 discusses the main 
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features and solution of the model and section 3.2 provides the simulation results of 
the model under different parameter values.   
 
3.1) The Model 
 
This section provides the characterization and the solution of the model in 
subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 respectively. 
 
3.1.1) Features of the Model 
Our model includes two sectors, say the traditional sector and the modern sector. The 
representatives of these sectors can be seen as two different interest groups.  At the 
beginning, capital stock of the members in the modern sector will be higher than of 
the members in the traditional sector. We can think of the members in the same 
interest group as identical to each other.  The per capita production function of group 
j is defined as: 
 ( ) )(, jjj kfNFAy ⋅= , where 0' 2,1 >A  and 0'' 2,1 <A  and 0'>f  and 0'' <f  (1) 
Where jy  is the output, A represents the level of technology, F represents the level 
of formal institutions, jk  represents the per capita level of capital stock and jN  
stands for the level of informal institutions for group j ∈  {1, 2}  (1 represents the 
traditional sector and 2 represents the modern sector). As in Neyapti (2010b), we 
enter the technology in the production function as a function of institutions that 
define production relations; higher levels of institutional quality imply lower 
transaction costs and greater efficiency in production. Furthermore, we assume that, 
for simplicity, both groups produce the same type of consumption good and consume 
only their own product. Hence, we normalize the price of the goods to 1.   
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The initial level of informal institutions, which represent the business ethics, way of 
doing business or the level of technological know-how, differs for each group. In the 
simulation part of the model, we assume that the initial level of informal institutions 
of the modern sector is higher than of the ones in traditional sector. As in Neyaptı 
(2010b), informal institutions evolve continuously with the capital stock as a result of 
learning by doing that can be shown by the following processes for the two sectors: 
 )( 11 11 ttt kgNN += −  , where  0)(' 1 >tkg  ; 0)('' 1 <tkg  
)( 22 12 ttt khNN += −  , where   0)(' 2 >tkh  ; 0)('' 2 <tkh                         
(2) 
(3) 
The functions g and h are sector specific and determine the evolution patterns of 
informal institutions.3 On the other hand, the level of formal institutions is the same 
for all groups, because formal institutions, which are considered as rules, laws, 
regulations that define the organizational characteristics of production, are set by the 
government. 
 
The resource constraint for sector j, which is in per capita terms, is expressed as:  
 
j
t
j
t
j
tt
j
t
j
t yyNFFIc =∆++ ),/,(ψ  (4) 
Where c stands for consumption, I stands for investment; and the function ψ  
represents the cost that has to be paid by group j proportional to income level. In 
addition to income level, the cost depends on the amount of change in the level of 
formal institutions and inconsistencies between formal and informal institutions. The 
details of the cost function will be explained further on.   
 
In this model, the saving rate is assumed to be constant and identical across all 
members of the society. Investment equation for each group is defined as: 
                                                 
3
 The explicit forms of these equations are provided in the simulations part. 
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j
t
j
t ysI .=  (5) 
Hence, next period’s capital stock will be the following: 
The cost function ψ  is defined in the following way:            
 [ ] jtj
t
tj
ttt
j
t
j
tt yN
F
yFFyNFF ).1.(.)(.),/,( 211 −+−=∆ − γγψ  
(7) 
As can be observed from the above equation, we divide the cost function into two 
terms. The first term of the cost function is considered as administrative cost of 
changing the formal institutions that accrues to group j. This component can be 
considered as a tax that is collected from the members of the group j, which are in 
turn used by the government to finance the institutional reform. The cost of changing 
formal institutions is proportional to the amount of change which implies that large 
scale reforms are more costly to the both groups. When there is no institutional 
reform in a given period, the interest groups do not pay any cost. 
 
The second term of the cost function stands to measure economic inefficiency, 
accruing to each group, resulting from inconsistencies between formal and informal 
institutions. The greater the inconsistencies between these institutions, the higher the 
resulting losses. We use the ratio of j
t
t
N
F
 as an indicator of inconsistency. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that for each group, the level of formal institutions is 
smaller than the informal ones. Hence, the higher the ratio of F to N, the more 
consistent the institutional structure. In light of these, this portion of the cost function 
is interpreted as the cost of maintaining, or operating, current period’s formal 
institutions faced by the group j. It can be observed from the above equation that, if 
 
1).1( +=−+ ttjt kkI δ  (6) 
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the formal and informal institutions are fully consistent with each other namely, if F 
to N  ratio is equal to 1, then, this portion of the cost function is equal to 0. 
 
Combining equations (4), (5) and (7), per capita consumption levels for each group 
can be written in the following form:  
 [ ]














−−−−−=
− j
t
t
tt
j
t N
F
FFsc 1)(.1 211 γγ . jty  
(8) 
 
In this model, the government chooses current period’s level of formal institutions 
( tF ) in order to maximize the weighted sum of the utilities. We assume that the 
weights are equal. The government’s optimization problem is defined as: 
 
tF
max    )(
2
1)(
2
1 21
tt cucu +  
(9) 
Where the utility functions are in logarithmic forms for both of the groups:  
 )ln()( jtjt ccu =  (10) 
As different from a social planner problem, our government does the maximization 
period by period, rather than intertemporally. In other words, the government cares 
only about the present time. In democratic systems, governments always face with 
the probability of loosing the next elections. Hence, we assume that, in order to 
increase the chance of reelection, governments focus on the current benefits of 
interest groups rather than thinking about long run. By accommodating the current 
demands of interest groups, governments believe that they can get the support of 
these groups and save the day. Based on these, we assume that the government 
chooses tF  each period optimally according to the joint preferences of the interest 
groups. We also assume that even tough the government is replaced with another one, 
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the new government also solves the same problem. This assumption helps us to make 
analysis over the long time periods.  
 
Per capita output of group j, which is defined implicitly by equation (1), is expressed 
explicitly in the following way: 
 ( ) αθ )(. jtjttjt kNFy =  (11) 
 
Using equations (9), (10) and (11), utility function of an agent j will be the following: 
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(12) 
 
Then, in a more explicit form, the objective function of the government becomes: 
tF
max     [ ]
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We also impose the following admissibility constraints on tF : 
i) [ ]
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ii)  1−≥ tt FF  
iii)  ),min( 21 ttt NNF ≤  
The first constraint implies that consumption shares of the income can not be 
negative. The second constraint tells that institutional reform should increase the 
quality of formal institutions. Finally, the third constraint determines the upper limit 
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for tF  which indicates that the current level of formal institutions can not exceed the 
level of informal institutions for both of the groups. If one of the above constraints is 
violated by the candidate tF , which maximizes the objective function of the 
government, then the level of formal institutions are not changed. In other words, 
optimal level of formal institutions at time t is equal to the level of formal institutions 
at time t-1. 
 
The dynamics of the model can be summarized briefly as follows: 
a) Previous period’s savings together with the undepreciated portion of the 1−tk  
defines tk . 
b) The evolution of jtN  depends on jtk  and jtN 1− . 
c) Given the above constraints, jtN  and jtk , the government chooses tF  
optimally in order to maximize the weighted utilities of the interest groups. 
 
3.1.2) Solution of the Model 
Now we turn to the solution of the maximization problem. In order to simplify the 
solution of the problem, we used the following identity: 
]).()ln[()ln(.
2
1)ln(.
2
1 2/122/1121
tttt cccc =+  
Furthermore, the term 2/122/11 ).()( tt cc  is expressed as:  
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                                                          1x  
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.
2/22/12/22/1 ).().().()( ααθθ tttt kkNN  
[___________________________]                      (14) 
                          2x  
Since the components of 2x  are determined at time t-1, the maximizing tF  of the 
above equation, which is denoted by mtF can be expressed as: 
 )}max{ln(arg)}ln()max{ln(arg 121 xxxF mt =+=  (15) 
Hence, from equation (14) and (15), mtF  maximizes the following expression:  
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The first order condition with respect to tF   yields the following expression: 
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The second derivative test, which proves that the solution of the above equation is a 
local maximizer, is provided in Appendix A3. However, as we mentioned before, 
although mtF  satisfies the first order condition, it is not chosen by the government if 
it violates one of the constraints that we imposed on tF . In such a case, optimal tF , 
which is denoted by *tF is equal to the previous period’s formal institutions. 
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3.2) Simulations   
 
This section is organized as follows: section 3.2.1 describes the methodology 
followed in simulating the model and section 3.2.2 discusses the results of the 
simulations and its interpretations. 
 
3.2.1) Methodology 
In order to simulate the model, I wrote a matlab code which replicates the properties 
of the model discussed in section 3.1. To find the optimal tF , the program solves the 
first order condition given in Equation (17). Although this equation has two roots, we 
saw that one root always violates the first constraint; in other words, we have a single 
root that satisfies the non-negativity of the consumption. The matlab code also 
checks for the remaining constraints. We observe that the root that satisfies the first 
constraint not always satisfies the remaining two constraints. 4  If one of the 
constraints is violated, then the government chooses 1* −= tt FF . Namely, the level of 
previous period’s informal institutions is preserved. The code makes simulations 
over 200 periods and keeps track of the variables such as capital stocks, level of 
informal institutions, consumptions and incomes of the interest groups over time. 
The derivates of the optimal F with respect to model parameters are also simulated.  
 
3.2.2) Simulation Results 
We observe the evolution pattern of formal institutions under different scenarios, 
defined by different initial values of F, NJ and kJ and the model parameters. Given 
the values of the parameters and variables at t=0, the government starts to make 
optimization from t=1 and onwards. 
                                                 
4
 See section 3.1.1. 
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Although our simulations give reasonable results for other functional forms that 
define the evolution of informal institutions, we assume the following explicit forms: 
5/)( 2.011 11 ttt kNN += −  
  10/)( 02.022 12 ttt kNN += −  
The above equations imply that 1N  grows faster than 2N  resulting from higher 
effect of capital stock. Throughout the simulations, initial value of the informal 
institutions and capital stocks of the group 2 is set to be higher than of the group 1. 
However, since 1N  grows faster than 2N , we observe that informal institutions of 
group 1 usually catch up and exceed the informal institutions of group 2. Moreover, 
since informal institutions have an effect on capital accumulation and income, we 
observe that 1k and 1y may eventually exceed 2k and 2y  , respectively, over time. 
 
Table 1 shows the initial values of the capital stocks and parameters that we use in 
the simulations.5  Using these values, we simulate our model for different initial 
levels of formal and informal institutions, where the level of these institutions is a 
measurable index that is on a positive scale, and for different values of the cost 
parameters 1γ  and 2γ . Throughout the simulations, we took 1γ = 2γ for simplicity.  
 
Table 1: Initial Values of the Parameters and Capital Stocks 
1
0k  
2
0k  δ  α  θ  s 
1 2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.1 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Depreciation rate (δ ) is taken 0.1 which is consistent with Nadiri and Prucha (1996) where they   
estimate it between 0.059 and 0.12. Additionally, Mankiw et al, (1995) show that the income share of 
the capital (α ) is equal to 0.3 for U.S. θ  is taken as in Neyaptı (2010b). The saving rate is selected 
to be a relatively low one, although higher rates also lead to similar findings. 
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Figure 1: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 01.0,40,30 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 2: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 005.0,40,30 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 1 and figure 2 imply that, as cost parameter decreases, F* persists over longer 
periods. This comes from the fact that smaller cost parameter yields to higher level of 
F* values that satisfies the first order condition given in equation (17). However, 
high values of F* violate the third constraint which tells that the level of formal 
institutions can not exceed the level of informal institutions. Since this constraint is 
violated, the level of formal institutions is not changed. Hence, F* only changes 
when the level of informal institutions becomes high enough so that F* does not 
violate the constraint. We also observe that although smaller cost parameter leads to 
longer periods of persistence, the amount of change in F* and the final level of F* 
are higher when the cost parameter is small. 
 
We also made additional simulations, which are provided in Appendix A. In all 
simulations, we observed that initial level of F* does not have a significant effect on 
its final value. The difference between the final values of F* when we start from 
different initial levels is negligibly small.  
 
The figures that we provide in Appendix A, show that initial level of informal 
institutions plays an important role on the persistence of formal institutions. Initial 
value of 1N , which is assumed to be smaller than the initial value of  2N  in all 
simulations, determines the persistence of F*. For the same cost parameter, we 
observe that as initial 1N becomes smaller, F* persists over longer periods.  
 
In addition to the persistence of F*, initial level of informal institutions may also 
affect the final value of F*. However, it is not possible to observe systematic 
relationship between the initial level of informal institutions and the final value of F*. 
The economy described by figure 4 implies that when both initial 1N  and 2N  is 
relatively small, the final value of F* is also smaller as compared to the economies 
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with higher initial level of informal institutions.6 Additionally, we observe that the 
economy depicted by figure 2 ends up with the smaller level of F* as compared to 
the economies with the same cost parameter. In this economy, we see that initial 
2N is smaller than of the other economies’. On the other hand, we also observe that 
different initial level of informal institutions may also lead to same level of F*. This 
can be observed from Figures 1, 3, 5 and 6. Similar findings can be obtained by 
analyzing Figures 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 together.  
 
In all simulations, except the economies described by Figures 5 and 9, we see that the 
income of group 1, which is assumed to be initially smaller than of group 2 
throughout the simulations, catches up and exceeds the income of group 2 over time.  
The timing of catch up depends on the dispersion between the initial levels of 
informal institutions. According to simulations, when dispersion between the initial 
levels of informal institutions is greater, the income of group 2 catches up the income 
of group 1 later.  
 
We also analyzed the response of optimal F (denoted by F*) to the changes in the 
underlying model parameters. Writing a Matlab subroutine, we checked the 
derivatives for the following ranges of the model parameters: 0.1< θ  <1 ; 0.005 < γ  
< 0.1; 0.05< s <0.4. Doing this gives us information about how changes in 
parameters affect F*. The following table summarizes the partial derivatives. Since 
we take 21 γγ =  throughout the simulations, we use the term γ  instead of using two 
different symbols. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 We made our comparisons between the economies which have same cost parameter. 
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Table 2: Partial Derivates of F* 
 θddF /*  γddF /*  dsdF /*  
sign + - - 
 
Table 3: Second Derivatives and Cross Derivatives of F* 
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Tables 2 and 3 imply that, an increase in the income share of the institutions, 
namelyθ , leads to an increase in F* .However, F* increases with θ  at a decreasing 
rate.  We also observe that, the cost parameter γ  has a negative effect on F* which 
can also be observed from simulation results. As can be seen from table 3, F* 
decreases with γ  at an increasing rate. In addition to γ , the saving rate, which is 
denoted by s, has also negative impact on F*.  
 
Simulations also reveal that the income share of the capital, namely α ,does not have 
an effect on the level of F*, but it affects the timing of institutional change. As 
Appendix A2 shows, an increase in α  is associated with shorter durations before a 
change in F* takes place. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
In this study, we modify and extend Neyaptı (2010)’s dynamic model of institutional 
evolution into a political economy framework where preferences of two income 
groups shape the path of institutional evolution. This study proposes an original 
political economy model which describes the co-evolution of formal and informal 
institutions. While modeling institutional change, we consider a government that 
optimally chooses the level of formal institutions by maximizing the sum of the 
utilities of the two groups period by period. Informal institutions are group-specific 
and evolving continuously as a positive function of the respective groups’ capital 
stocks.  
 
The evolution of formal institutions exhibits punctuations over time instead of 
continuous progression. The main findings of model simulations reveal that initially 
smaller levels of informal institutions leads to slower evolution whereas higher 
income share of the capital appear to speed the process of institutional change. We 
also observe that, as the cost parameter decreases, the final level of formal 
institutions increases although they persist over longer periods. 
 
As the current study is an original attempt to model the evolution of formal and 
informal institutions from political economy perspective, it bears a rich potential of 
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future extensions. For instance, this study can be extended by solving the problem of 
social planner over infinite horizon in addition to the government’s optimization 
problem. In another extension, the weights in the government’s objective function 
can be taken proportional to income levels of the interest groups, rather than taking 
them equal. Also, different saving rates among the interest groups can be considered 
for further simulations. Finally, our approach to the evolution of formal and informal 
institutions may be extended to a wider framework. Because, it is possible to observe 
that evolution of informal institutions may also perform punctuations and formal 
institutions may evolve continuously. In this sense, this model can be developed in 
order to include these aspects of institutional evolution. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX A1 
 
 
This section provides the trajectory of formal institutions (F) and incomes of the 
interest groups over time for different initial levels of informal institutions and cost 
parameters. Each figure is put on the separate page for the convenience of the reader. 
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Figure 3: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 01.0,60,10 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 4: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 01.0,10,5 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 5: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 01.0,80,10 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 6: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 01.0,60,30 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 7: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 005.0,60,40 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 8: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 005.0,80,60 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 9: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 005.0,80,10 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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Figure 10: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 005.0,60,30 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
Initial F=1 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
time
Ft
Initial F=10 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
time
Ft
Incomes of the groups for initial F=1 ,y1:---,y2:— 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
time
In
co
m
es
Incomes of the groups for initial F=10 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
time
In
co
m
e
s
 46 
Figure 11: Trajectory of F* and incomes ( 005.0,60,10 212010 ==== γγNN ) 
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APPENDIX A2 
 
 
 
 
 
The below graphs show that income share of the capital, namelyα does not have an 
effect on the level of F*, but affects the timing of institutional change. 
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Figure 12: Trajectories of F* with different levels of α  
( 40,30 2010 == NN , 100 =F , 21 γγ = =0.005) 
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Figure 13: Trajectories of F* with different levels of α  
( 60,10 2010 == NN , 100 =F , 21 γγ = =0.01) 
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APPENDIX A3 
 
 
 
 
 
In this section we prove that the solution of the first order condition defined by 
equation (17) is a local maximizer. 
Proof: In order to show that the solution of equation (17) is a local maximizer, we 
need to check the sign of the second derivative of equation (16). Since we take 
21 γγ =  in our simulations, I am going to use the term γ  instead of 1γ and 2γ . 
Hence, the second derivative of equation (16) is equal to: 
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Since the second derivative is negative, solution of the equation (17) is a local 
maximizer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
